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Abstract 
This study investigated how power impacts the ability to orient attention across space.  
Participants were assigned to a high power or control role and then performed a computerised 
spatial cueing task in which they were required to direct their attention to a target that had 
been preceded by either a valid or invalid location cue.  Compared to participants in the 
control condition, power-holders were better able to override the misinformation provided by 
invalid cues.  This advantage occurred only at 500 ms stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), 
whereas at 1000 ms SOA, when there was more time to prepare a response, no differences 
were found.  These findings are taken to support the growing idea that social power affects 
cognitive flexibility. 
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Social power affects the way in which information is attended and discriminated 
(Fiske, 1993; Guinote, 2007a).  Power holders have more resources and fewer constraints 
which gives them more attentional resources and allows them to discriminate between 
relevant and irrelevant information (Guinote, 2007a; Overbeck & Park, 2001).  In contrast, 
powerless people face more constraints and environmental threats (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & 
Anderson, 2003).  Their dependency encourages them to attend to multiple cues in the 
environment, in search of any potentially useful information.  Thus, they treat information 
more equally, attending not only to the central information but also to the peripheral or 
distracting information (Slabu & Guinote, 2010).  This overflow in information processing 
makes powerless people less able to respond promptly to specific situational demands, and 
induces attentional inflexibility (Guinote, 2007a).  
Research using basic cognitive paradigms supports these claims.  For example, 
Guinote (2007b) showed that high power participants are better able to focus their attention to 
target objects and ignore the influence of irrelevant background distracters (see also Smith & 
Trope, 2006).  A further outcome of the cognitive flexibility experienced by powerful 
individuals is the increased ability to adjust their actions in line with changing contextual 
cues.  This includes the ability to suppress dominant responses and implement non-dominant 
ones when the task calls for non-dominant responses (Guinote, 2007b).  
The present research aims to further explore how power affects attentional processing.   
In particular, we focused on how power affects attentional orienting.  Orienting is the process 
by which the attentional spotlight is moved to a specific location in space, a process induced 
either automatically by a salient exogenous cue such as an unexpected flash, or voluntarily 
according to the current behavioural goal.  Orienting can be distinguished from other aspects 
of attentional control that are more concerned with either maintaining a general state of 
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vigilance, or planning and selecting a specific goal while inhibiting and updating others 
(sometimes referred to as executive functions).  Physiological evidence for this tri-partite 
system of attentional control is provided by functional MRI which shows that orienting, 
vigilance and executive control are each associated with discrete patterns of brain activity 
(Fan, McCandliss, Fossella, Flombaum, & Posner, 2005; Posner, Rueda, & Kanske, 2007; 
Wright & Ward, 2008).  Although the effects of social power on orienting and vigilance have 
received little attention, mounting evidence suggests that power affects executive processing.  
For example, several studies have shown that having power increases the ability to resolve 
conflicts and plan action sequences; power-holders are immune to stimulus-response 
compatibility effects, and are better able to switch attention between the holistic and detailed 
components of stimuli, as changing task demands dictate (Guinote, 2007b; Smith, Jostmann, 
Galinsky, & van Dijk, 2008).  However, no studies have shown that power affects the more 
rudimentary process of orienting, a skill fundamental to many daily activities. 
One conventional means of exploring attentional orienting is via Posner‟s spatial 
cueing task.  Participants are asked to indicate, as quickly as possible, the whereabouts of a 
predefined target on a computer screen.  The target is preceded by a cue which indicates the 
likely location of the upcoming target.  On „valid‟ trials, the cue accurately indicates the 
location of the target while on „invalid‟ trials it cues attention to another location.  This 
simple task is taken to tap three distinct aspects of attentional orienting;  disengagement, shift 
and engagement (Posner & Cohen, 1984; Posner, Walker, Friedrich, & Rafal, 1984).  While 
valid trials simply require attention to engage the target, invalid trials require attention to be 
first disengaged from the anticipated target location and then shifted to the actual location 
before being re-engaged.  Accordingly, invalid cues typically invoke a cost in reaction time, 
the magnitude of which can be enhanced by either increasing the proportion of valid to 
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invalid trials and thus altering participant‟s reliance on the cue or reducing the time between 
cue onset and target onset. 
Because powerful people control their outcomes (Fiske, 1993), they have less 
restrictions and face less interference from others, which allows them to concentrate their 
cognitive resources to the task at hand.  This greater cognitive capacity relates to a greater 
ability to control attention and avoid distractions (i.e., invalid cues).  Given the greater 
attentional control and greater cognitive flexibility of powerful individuals, one might expect 
them to be less affected by invalid cues when orienting their attention than those individuals 
who find themselves in less powerful positions.  More so, any such effect may be magnified 
as the time between cue offset and target onset decreases; at relatively short stimulus onset 
asynchronies (SOAs) (i.e. 500ms), the cognitive flexibility of powerful individuals is most 
likely to come to the fore as there is relatively little time with which to prepare responses for 
the unexpected occurrence of an invalid trial.  At considerably longer SOAs (i.e. 1000 ms) 
much more time is available to prepare for this outcome and accordingly, less powerful 
people may be better able to compensate for their cognitive inflexibility.  That is, they now 
have the time needed to prepare two potential responses – one if the cue proves to be valid, 
and one if it is invalid.  As a consequence, any effects of social power on spatial cuing may 
be smaller at longer compared to shorter SOAs. 
With these issues in mind, we therefore conducted a simple exogenous cueing 
experiment comprising valid and invalid trials with SOAs of 500 ms and 1000 ms.  We 
predicted that high power participants, compared to control participants, would be especially 
advantaged for invalid trials that incorporated a short SOA. 
Method 
Participants 
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 Fifty-eight students from the University of Kent, UK, participated in the experiment 
in exchange of course credits.  Ten participants were dropped: four because of an error with 
the program, four for not following the instructions and two because of exceptionally high 
error rates (i.e., higher than 3 standard deviations).  This left 48 participants (41 females) for 
the analyses, with an age between 18 and 27 years (M = 19.09, SD = 1.54).   
Procedure 
 Upon arrival, participants were informed that they would work on two independent 
studies.  The first study involved the power manipulation, which was adapted from Fiske and 
Dépret (1996).  Participants were asked to decide whether a lecture theatre should be 
converted into a new studio.  Those in the powerful condition read that their opinion will 
account for 40% of the final decision; whereas participants in the control condition were told 
that their opinions will not have any impact on the final decision made by the university.  
The second study was the spatial cueing task as seen in Figure 1.  As a means of 
centralising gaze, participants had to first verbally report a digit appearing in the middle of 
the screen (responses were not recorded).  After an interval of 17 ms, the cue was signalled 
by one of the peripheral squares turning bright yellow for 200 ms.  The cue was valid 64% of 
the time or invalid 16% of the time.  To check for cue responding, the remaining 20% of 
trials were catch trials (with no cue displayed).  The target then appeared, in random order but 
the same number of times, in either the left or right box.  The interval (i.e., SOA) between 
cue and target was either 500 ms or 1000 ms, the order of which was again randomised, 
though, both SOAs occurred with the same frequency.  Participants were instructed to say out 
loud the number and then indicate the location of the target (i.e., asterisk) as quickly and 
accurately as possible.  Instructions also emphasized that they should keep their eyes fixed on 
the middle of the screen at all times.  Responses were made by pressing one of two keys 
(target left: “1”, target right: “5”) with the index and middle finger of the dominant hand 
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placed on the response box keys.  Reaction time (RT) was measured in milliseconds from 
target onset until the participant‟s key press.  Each participant was presented with 200 trials. 
After the cueing experiment, participants were asked to rate their mood (Forgas, 
1994) on four 7-point scales ranging from –3 (very bad; very sad; very discontent; very tense) 
to 3 (very good; very happy, very content; very relaxed), and complete a self-efficacy 
questionnaire (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) to rule out the possibility that mood and self-
efficacy might mediate the effects of power on invalid trials.  Finally, participants were 
debriefed and thanked. 
Results 
Data Preparation 
In line with previous cueing studies (Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & 
Crombez, 2005), RTs of less than 200 ms were treated as guesses and RTs greater than 750 
ms were considered as non-responses and were eliminated from consideration (2.8 %).  Also, 
RTs deviating more than 3 SDs from the individual mean were excluded (1.4 %) in order to 
control for univariate outliers.  Trials with errors (1.2%) and catch trials were discarded from 
analysis; however, power did not impact erroneous responses or catch trials, ts < 1.  
Statistical analyses were run on 94.6 % of the data.  The response times were log-transformed 
(natural logarithm function) to correct for skewness and mean RTs were calculated for each 
experimental condition. 
Overall effects  
No significant effects were found when gender was included in the analysis, so this 
factor was discarded from further investigation.  The mean RTs were subjected to a 2 (power: 
powerful, control) x 2 (cue type: valid, invalid) x 2 (SOA: 500, 1000 ms) mixed-design 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with power as the between-subjects factor.  Two significant 
main effects emerged: for SOA, F(1,46) = 79.83, p < .001, η2 = .63, with shorter responses 
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following the 1000 ms SOA (M = 367) relative to 500 ms (M = 390); and for cue type, 
F(1,46) = 38.84, p < .001, η2 = .46, with shorter responses for valid (M = 365) than invalid 
trials (M = 393).  
The SOA x Power interaction also reached significance, F(1,46) = 7.58, p < .008, η2 = 
.14, while the three-way interaction between Cue Type x SOA x Power approached 
significance, F(1,46) = 3.92, p  = .05, η2 =  .08.  No other reliable effects emerged (Fs  < 
1.60).  
Given that our predictions emphasised the role of SOA in moderating any effect of 
power, the three-way interaction was broken down into two separate ANOVAs for the two 
different SOAs (500 and 1000 ms).  Mean RTs and standard deviations for this interaction are 
shown in Table 1.  
500 ms SOA 
For the short SOA condition, a 2 (cue type: valid, invalid) x 2 (power: powerful, 
control) mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA), with power as the between-subjects 
variable revealed a significant main effect for cue type, F(1,46) = 45.07, p < .001, η2 = .50, 
whereby  participants produced shorter responses to valid (M = 376) compared to invalid 
trials (M = 405).  
As expected, the two-way interaction was found to be reliable, F(1,46) = 4.57, p < 
.04, η2 = .09.  Simple effects analysis confirmed that powerful (M = 389) participants 
generated shorter responses on invalid trials compared to control participants (M = 420) 
(F(1,46) = 5.09, p < .03, η2 = .10).  No difference between powerful and control participants 
emerged during valid trials F(1,46) = 1.04, p < .31, η2 = .02. 
1000 ms SOA 
For the long SOA condition, a 2 (cue type: valid, invalid) x 2 (power: powerful, 
control) ANOVA, with power as the between-subjects variable, indicated a significant main 
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effect of cue type, F(1,46) = 28.62, p < .001, η2 = .38, with shorter responses to valid (M = 
353) compared to invalid trials (M = 382).  Consistent with our predictions, the Cue Type x 
Power interaction did not reach significance, F(1,46) = 0.24, p = .63, η2 = .005. 
Mood and self-efficacy 
 Mood scale items were combined into a single score (α = .75, M = .58, SD = .89) as 
well as self-efficacy items (α = .71, M = 2.85, SD = .39).  An independent-samples t test 
revealed that power neither impacted participants‟ mood, t(46) = -0.60 p = .55 nor self-
efficacy ratings (t(46) = 0.75, p = .46). 
Discussion 
The present study examined whether power affects the ability to orient attention 
across space.  When the pre-cue correctly indicated the position of the target (i.e., valid trials) 
no differences were found between high power and control participants.  By contrast, when 
the pre-cue was invalid and there was relatively little time (i.e. 500 ms) between cue offset 
and target onset to prepare and implement a response, power holders showed a temporal 
advantage.  In contrast, at longer SOA (1000 ms), no differences emerged between high 
power and control participants on either valid or invalid trials.  Post-test questionnaires 
confirmed that these effects could not be attributed to differences in positive affect or self-
efficacy. 
We suggest that power most affected performance during invalid trials because these 
required a greater degree of cognitive flexibility; individuals needed to ignore the cue and 
unexpectedly orient attention towards the opposite location.  In line with this account, the 
effect was only evident at relatively short SOAs where participants had little time to prepare 
an appropriate response.  At longer SOAs or on valid trials, the need for flexibility was lower 
which may explain why no effect was seen.   
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These effects may arise because power influences control needs and subsequently 
attention (Fiske, 1993; Guinote, 2007a).  Individuals who find themselves in a powerful 
position benefit from increased resources and fewer constraints which in turn allow them to 
maintain their focus solely on the relevant aspects of the task at hand.  They can therefore 
more flexibly utilize and control voluntary operations involving attention.  On a cautionary 
note, we point out that additional empirical work is needed to understand the full spectrum of 
the effects of power on attention orienting.  For example, one needs to know what the 
boundary conditions of the effects of power are, by examining the role of the proportion of 
valid and invalid trials in power holders‟ attention orienting. 
More broadly, our findings build on those reported by Willis, Rodriguez-Bailon and 
Lupianez (2011) who showed that powerful individuals can make a better use of cues present 
in the environment to increase their executive control (see also Smith, et al., 2008).  Their 
data support the idea that social power can impact rudimentary processes associated with 
spatial orienting and control.   
From an ecological perspective, this is important because an advantage in the time 
taken to unexpectedly orient away from one stimulus towards another will speed decision-
making and improve access to environmental resources.  Facilitation in attention orienting 
may signal goal-related cues and benefit goal directed actions. 
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Table 1 
Response latencies (in milliseconds) on a spatial cueing task by SOA, trial and power (N = 
48, Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 500ms  1000ms  
 Valid Invalid Valid Invalid 
Powerful  370  389  351 376  
 (48) (56) (41) (70) 
Control 383 420  355  386  
 (39) (48) (37) (52) 
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Valid 
Trial 
 
Invalid 
Trial 
Fixation 500 ms       Blank 17 ms  Cue 200 ms      SOA 500 or 1000 ms 
 
Catch 
Trial 
     Fixation 500 ms       Blank 17 ms              SOA 483 or 983 ms 
 
Time 
 
Figure 1.  All stimuli appeared white on a black background.  Displays consisted of three 
boxes (unfilled squares); one in the centre of the screen with the others positioned 8
0
 to the 
left or right.  The target appeared as an asterisk that subtended 1.2
0
.  Each trial consisted of a 
fixation digit presented for 500 ms; a blank interval of 17 ms; a cue (brightening of one of the 
boxes) for 200 ms; followed by a target (asterisk) presented after a stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA) of 500 or 1000 ms.  The target remained in view until a response was made. 
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